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Abstract: I propose a dynamic production model based on the joint constraints of 
technology, budget and no arbitrage. It is shown that this no-arbitrage based production 
theory turns out to be a natural generalization of classical production theory based on profit 
maximization, and confers some methodological advantages over the traditional approach. 
This no-arbitrage framework for production emphasizes the general equilibrium of the 
economic system as a whole and constitutes a marriage of production theory and finance, 
containing the Modigliani-Miller theorem as a consequence. Further, this no-arbitrage based 
production theory constructs a bridge between microeconomics and macroeconomics, and 
successfully reconciles some long-standing contradictions arising from the classical theory. 
For example, it is shown that there does not exist an unconditional trade-off between inflation 
and output (Lucas 1973; Friedman and Schwartz 1982). This reconciles the long-standing 
confliction between Keynesian doctrine (Keynes 1936) and the empirical evidence, which 
was widely regarded as the failure of Keynesian revolution (Lucas and Sargent 1978). 
Comparative static analysis and dynamic analysis indicate that this model is consistent with 
the behavior of firms in reality, and can explain a wide range of economic phenomena, 
including the occurrence of stagflation, Balassa–Samuelson effect and economic growth. 
Finally, no-arbitrage based production theory gives rise to a new method of calculating the 
equilibrium exchange rate between any two countries with arbitrary production functions. 
Keywords: No Arbitrage, Modigliani-Miller Theorem, Gibson paradox, Phillips curve, 
Purchasing Power Parity, Balassa-Samuelson effect, Lucas critique 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The goal of classical production theory is to study the behavior of the profit-
maximizing firms. It is shown that in the long run competition will drive the economic 
system to the equilibrium state in which the profit-maximizing firms are earning a zero 
economic profit, with no incentive to either enter or leave the industry.  
However, the limitations of classical production theory cannot be neglected: 
1. It lacks of empirical meaning in practice. First of all, to precisely calculate economic 
profit on an investment we have to know the corresponding opportunity cost, including 
labor and capital. Therefore, to know the true opportunity cost necessitates precisely 
measuring capital. This theoretic difficulty will inevitably lead to the longstanding 
Capital Controversy: in what units capital is measured? (see Robinson 1971)  
Furthermore, no budget constraint appears in the description of behavior of firms. 1 In 
reality, however, firms like consumers are subject to budget constraints, to which the 
Arrow-Debreu (1954) framework for general equilibrium theory have paid little attention 
(see Kuga 1996). In fact, much work in corporate finance has been devoted to the study 
of the firm’s budget constraint (see Kornai 1979; Qian Yingyi 1994;  Maskin 1996; Lin 
Yifu and Tan Guofu 1999). 
2. It is fundamentally microeconomic in character. Money plays no significant role in 
classical production theory. This contradicts the fact that monetary policy has a profound 
impact on production decision in practice. In fact, the dichotomy of real and monetary 
economics has been extensively debated and criticized (see Modigliani 1963). 
3. It is based on partial equilibrium in theory. The classical production theory only 
analyzes a single industry, taken prices and wages as given. This will unconditionally 
lead to zero-profit equilibrium in the industry alone, regardless of the existence of risk-
free assets in a whole economy with multiple interacting markets.  In fact, the existence 
______ 
1
 The traditional analytical distinction between firms and households is that firms are not supposed to be subject to 
budget constraints. But in practice, the existence and importance of a budget constraint becomes patently clear, and the 
traditional distinction is blurred and perhaps vanished (see Becker 1962).  
of risk-free assets may help to set a lower bound to the rate of return on investment and 
hence prevent the return on investment from being driven to zero. 2 
4. It is essentially static in nature. 3 It tries to dodge the difficult problem of specifying 
the timing of inputs and related outputs by assuming stationary conditions. But we have 
no right to assume that there is no lag between expenditure and revenue. Further, risk 
may arise in the gap between investing money and receiving profits because unexpected 
events may occur which may alter the value of profit. To abstract from uncertainty means 
to postulate that no such events occur, so that the expected returns on investment never 
differs from the actual returns. The absence of risk and uncertainty shows itself 
particularly in the absence of asset preference (see Tobin 1958).  
Under uncertainty, rational firms will hold portfolio which makes their wealth grow at 
the fast rate of expected return (see Lucas and Prescott 1971). So, given any investment 
opportunity in certain industry, rational firms compare its expected rate of return with the 
risk-free interest rate and will choose to put their wealth in the asset with the higher yield. 
If the expected rate of return on investment exceeds the risk-free interest rate, then 
rational firms will enter the industry. Otherwise, if the expected rate of return on 
investment is lower than the risk-free interest rate, then rational firms will leave the 
industry to guarantee risk-free returns instead. In short, rational firm adjusts his 
investment budget so that its marginal rate of return is equal to the risk-free interest rate 
(see Tobin 1961).4 As a result, in the long run the economy will tend toward arbitrage 
equilibrium, rather than zero economic profit equilibrium.5 
On the other hand, the development of finance has shown that no arbitrage is more 
primitive than competitive equilibrium (see Dybvig and Ross 2008). First, the absence of 
______ 
2
 It has been shown that the concept of a minimal rate of return on capital (a required rate of profit) plays a key role in 
the theory of growth. For details, see Tobin (1965). 
3
 A close examination of the classical production theory will reveal that dynamic element have appeared, thanks to the 
device of “ short- and long-run equilibrium”, the oldest device of developing a dynamical theory with a static apparatus. 
4
 The validity of this statement depends on the assumption that rational firms are risk neutral, so that the degree of 
uncertainty (measured by Variance) will not affect investment decisions. Otherwise, risk premium must be considered (see 
Tobin 1958; Sharpe 1964). 
5
 The similarity between the absence of arbitrage and the zero economic profit condition for a firm has been noted by 
Dybvig and Ross (2008). The theoretical distinction between a zero profit condition and the absence of arbitrage is the 
distinction between commerce and simply trading under the price system, namely that commerce requires production. In 
practice, the distinction blurs. 
arbitrage does not require the economy to be in stable equilibrium, though a competitive 
equilibrium is invariably arbitrage-free. Second, the absence of arbitrage does not require 
all agents to be rational. Now that the absence of arbitrage turns out to be just a necessary 
condition for a competitive equilibrium (see Ang, Dong and Piazzesi 2007), there is a gap 
between the classical production theory and the production practice. 
To fulfill this gap, we can go one step back. Since economic profit cannot be measured 
directly (in the sense of Capital Controversy), we can approximate it indirectly by 
consider the accounting profit instead. So, we can relax the equilibrium condition of zero 
economic profit to the more general one of risk-free accounting profit, i.e., risk-free rate 
of return on investment. In other words, we can go back one further step to generalize the 
assumption of profit maximization to that of no arbitrage. This no-arbitrage approach 
means to develop a general equilibrium in multiple interacting markets: labor, capital, 
goods, and asset (include money market). As a result, we will get arbitrage equilibrium 
instead of competitive equilibrium. This technical route can be shown in the following 
scheme in which the horizontal arrows ( ) represent implication and the downward 
arrows ( ) represent generalization. 

profitAccountingfreeRiskmEquilibriuArbitrageArbitrageNo
profitEconomicZeromEquilibriueCompetitivonMaximizatiprofit
-


. 
Following this technical route a dynamic production model is built under joint 
constraints of technology, budget and no arbitrage. This is done essentially by assuming 
the existence of a fundamental time lag: the lag between the time when investment is 
taking place and the time when the resulting revenue is available. Dynamically, rational 
firm invests its total budget at the beginning of each period and gains a risk-free rate of 
return on investment at the end of each period. The very bridge that links this time lag is 
the risk-free interest rate, which is the bridge between present and future (see Fisher 1930, 
Chapter 1).6 
______ 
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 In Keynes’ words this means that “the importance of money essentially flows from its being a link between the present 
and the future…. Money in its significant attributes is, above all, a subtle device for linking the present to the future; and 
we cannot even begin to discuss the effect of changing expectations on current activities except in monetary terms. We 
In ex ante analysis, all of the three constraints are equilibrium conditions, but in ex post 
analysis, they turn out to be accounting identities. Comparative static analysis and 
dynamic analysis indicate that this model is consistent with the behavior of firms in 
reality, and can explain a wide range of economic phenomena. It will be seen that this no-
arbitrage based production theory is more fundamental and is logically prior to the profit-
maximizing production theory.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section II, the basic model of a closed 
economy under stationary state is constructed based on the joint constraints of technology, 
budget and no arbitrage. Section III focuses on the comparative static analysis of 
solutions for the model, with emphasis on micro-foundations for some empirical laws of 
macroeconomics. In section IV we extend the basic model to the case of stationary open 
economies. In section V we extend the basic model to the general case in order to study 
dynamic economies. Section VI concludes this paper with some methodology remarks.  
II.  STATIONARY CLOSED ECONOMIES 
To keep things as simple as possible, in this section we assume a stationary closed 
economy.  
II.A.  The Basic Model 
The building blocks from which the no-arbitrage production model is constructed are 
three in number: 1. technology Constraints; 2. budget constraints; and 3. no-arbitrage 
constraints.  
1. Technology Constraints.—The production function represents the possibilities 
afforded by an exogenous technology. A production function relates physical inputs to 
physical outputs, not involving prices. If Q  represents physical output, and K and  L
________ 
cannot get rid of money even by abolishing gold and silver and legal tender instruments. So long as there exists any durable 
asset, it is capable of possessing monetary attributes and, therefore, of giving rise to the characteristic problems of a 
monetary economy.” (Keynes 1936, Chapter 21) 
represent capital and labor in physical units, then the production function is a function of 
two variables 
(1) ),( LKAFQ  , 
where A stand for total factor productivity (see Prescott 1998). The production function 
fitted to empirical data actually reflects the accounting identity between values of inputs 
and outputs (see Simon 1979).  
In principle, production function may be distinguished for all sorts of commodities 
produced and for all sorts of production processes. In practice, production function can be 
estimated either for a single firm, or for an entire industry, or even for a nation as a whole.  
2. Budget Constraints.—Since resources are scarce, each firm is, at any period of time, 
constrained by its total wealth. Formally, assume that the total budget in terms of money 
is M  at the beginning of each period, or equivalently, at the end of the previous period. 
Then the efficient allocation of labor L  and capital K  at the beginning of each period 
must satisfy the budget constraint imposed by total wealth 
 (2) MWLiK  . 
Here,  is the wage of labor, and i  is the rental price of capital. Note that in 
competitive economy the equilibrium value of the rental price of capital (measured in 
terms of money) will equal the nominal interest rate. 
W
The budget constraint is an ex ante behavioral regularity, which exerts an influence on 
the firm's decision. Given the total budget M , the budget identity amounts to the budget 
line of the firm. 
3. No-Arbitrage Constraints.—In simple terms, an arbitrage opportunity is a money 
pump. The Fundamental Theorem of Finance derives the implications of the absence of 
such arbitrage opportunities (see Ross 2004). According to the Efficient-Market 
Hypothesis, real economy is arbitrage-free, given the information available at the time the 
investment is made (see Fama 1970).  
The no-arbitrage constraint means there is no such things as free launch. Thus, in 
equilibrium the rate of return is necessarily equal to the risk-free interest rate, and is the 
same no matter in terms of what it is measured. To be precise, let the risk-free interest 
rate to be r , then the total wealth at the end of each period always equals in 
terms of money. On the other hand, at the end of each period the firm’s total wealth 
consists of two parts: the physical output ( ) and the capital stock (
)1( rM 
Q K ). In equilibrium 
the market value of the physical output and the capital stock must add up to the total 
wealth at the end of each period. Were this not so an arbitrage process would be set in 
motion. 
But, to establish no-arbitrage constraint capital depreciation must be considered. 
Formally, let the depreciation rate of capital be  , which is a physic attribution of the 
capital and is less than unity, then the capital stock equals )1( K  at the end of each 
period.  
Assuming that output is sold at the end of each period,7 then the no-arbitrage constraint 
gives the following accounting identity 
(3) )1()1( rMiKPQ   , 
where  stands for the price level.  P
So far, we already have identified the three components of a complete economic model. 
In ex ante analysis, all of the three equations are equilibrium condition, but in ex post 
analysis, they turn out to be accounting identities. Since accounting identities must hold 
for any values of the variables we can interpret r  as actual or expected rate of return on 
investment whenever necessary. 
Now we put these three components together into a single framework that allows us to 
analyze them simultaneously. This means to develop a general equilibrium in all four 
markets: labor, capital, goods, and asset (include money market). Since there have three 
fundamental equations in general, to close the system three variables must be 
______ 
7
 We shall assume that in stationary economy the production period coincides with the maturity of risk-free interest rate. 
Time-to-build technology (see Kydland and Prescott 1982) will not be considered in this paper.  
endogenously determined. For convenience, the three endogenously determined variables 
will be called decision variables. Other exogenously determined variables will be called 
state variables and taken as given.  
II.B.  Analytic Solutions 
In this subsection we study the existence and calculation of analytical solution of the 
system of equation (1)-(3). In general, the solution of the system gives each of the three 
physical variables ( ) as multivariable functions of state variables. No maximum 
problem need be studied, and no derivatives need be taken. 
QLK ,,
To see the existence of solutions, just note that both the budget constraint and no-
arbitrage constraint are given by linear equations which jointly determine a straight line. 
The intersections of this straight line with the surface described by the production 
function determine the solution of the input and output. Specially, if the production 
function is linear then the corresponding surface degenerated into a plane, and hence 
analytic solution can be found explicitly.  
Now if the production function happens to be, or can be approximated by, a linear 
function 
(4)  bLaKKLFQ  ),( , 
then analytic solution can be found by solving the following system of linear equations in 
three unknowns  QLK ,,
(5)  . 






)1()1(
0
rMPQKi
MWLiK
QbLaK

The coefficient matrix of this system of linear equations is a square matrix 
(6)  . 











Pi
Wi
b
0)1(
0
1a

The determinant of this coefficient matrix is )1()(  WibiaWP . According to 
Cramer's rule, if the coefficient determinant satisfies 0 ,8 then this system of linear 
equations has a unique solution given by 
(7)  . 





























r
M
rM
M
Q
L
K
1
1
0
)1(
0
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where  is the inverse of the coefficient matrix. Note that, under linear production 
function, if we take the technique parameters ( ) and price variables ( ) as fixed, 
then the equilibrium values of real variables ( ) turn out to be determined 
essentially by monetary condition rather than by real factors. Other things being the same, 
a rise in total budget will cause real variables to increase.  
1
ba, PWi ,,
QLK ,,
In general, if the production function is non-linear, then the system does not have 
analytic solutions, i.e., can not be explicitly solved for decision variables ( ). 
Further, numerical analysis has shown that there may have two positive solutions in the 
case of the Cobb–Douglas production function . For instance,  
QLK ,,
LKQ 






)05.01(10000)08.01(513
1000085
7.03.0
KQ
LK
LKQ

______ 






121Q
37
1941
1
1
1
L
K
,  






713Q
1082
269
2
2
2
L
K
These two solutions have different capital-labor ratio and different level of output, and 
hence stand for different type of firms. Here the first firm has less output but has more 
capital stock, so it is less efficient in the short run but will be more efficient in the long 
run. On the contrary, the second firm is more efficient in the short run but will be less 
efficient in the long run.  
8
 It is routine to check that when the coefficient determinant equals zero ( 0 ) the system of linear equations has 
no solution since the rank of coefficient matrix is not equivalent to the rank of augmented matrix. 
Note that the optimal capital-labor ratio determined by the corresponding profit 
maximization problem is 
7.03.0..
max
LKQts
WLiKPQ

  68.0
57.0
83.0 

i
W
L
K


 
As a result, heterogeneous firms can coexist in arbitrage equilibrium. So, in general an 
economic system at a particular macroscopic state may occupy a number of microscopic 
states. This result differs from the classical production theory, but agrees with the 
thermodynamic equilibrium of physical system (see Feynman et al. 2013). 
II.C.  Zero-Profit Equilibrium 
In this subsection we show that the zero-profit equilibrium turns out to be a special 
case of the arbitrage equilibrium.  
Recall that in classical production theory the profit-maximization problem can break 
into two steps: First, find the minimum costs of producing any given level of output, and 
then choose the most profitable level of output. When a particular production is specified, 
solution of the profit-maximization problem yields the optimal decisions concerning the 
supply of output and the demand for labor and capital. However, this indirect approach 
cannot apply within the no-arbitrage framework since decision variables are 
simultaneously determined by the three constraints.  
Firstly, the technology constraint gives rise to the cost function by solving the cost 
minimization problem 
(8)  WLiKQC
QLKAF
 ),(min)( . 
Note that for any particular production function there is a particular cost function. 
Secondly, the budget constraint forces the firm to make rational choices, behaving in 
the same way like a consumer. In equilibrium, the total cost must equal the total budget, 
or mathematically 
(9)  MWLiKQC )( . 
Thus the budget constraint can also be regarded as cost constraint. 
Finally, the no-arbitrage constraint forces the net profit to be equal to the difference in 
total revenue and total cost, that is,  
(10)  )1()()(   iKMrMPQQCPQQ . 
So, under the no-arbitrage constraint we can get the condition for zero-profit equilibrium 
(11)  0)( Q  )1(  iKMr . 
This condition for zero-profit equilibrium can be interpreted as follows: in zero-profit 
equilibrium, the total risk-free interests are equal to the depreciated value of the capital 
stock. Thus there is no positive cash flow in zero-profit equilibrium. 
Solving for K  and then for we get L
(12)  
)1(  i
MrK ,
)1(
)1(




W
rML . 
From this it follows that, in zero-profit equilibrium, the choice of technique is 
independent of final demand (Q ).9  Therefore, in zero-profit equilibrium the economy 
will not substitute inputs (capital and labor) when final demand changes, since all 
desirable substitutions have been made by the competitive market. In the literature, this 
result is called Nonsubstitution Theorem (see Samuelson 1951; Koopmans 1951; Arrow 
1951; Mirrlees 1969; Stiglitz 1970).  
Rate of Profit. 10—The zero-profit equilibrium is just an idea state, corresponding to 
the “frictionless world” in Physics. In general, the net profit in arbitrage equilibrium does 
not tend to coincide with that in zero-profit equilibrium except by chance, since there is 
no mechanism that insures this coincidence. So it is natural to define the rate of profit by 
______ 
9
 The existence of effective arbitrage roughly equated the supply and demand. Thus, in no-arbitrage equilibrium the 
supply roughly equals final demand, and vice versa.  
10
 Historically, the term rate of profit was introduced by Marx (1894) in Volume III of Capital for the ratio of profit to 
total capital invested in a given cycle of reproduction. But here we adopt the conventional uses of the term “rate of profit”, 
which is similar to the concept of the rate of return on investment. 
(13)  1
/)()(
)(
)(
)( 
QQC
P
QC
QCPQ
QC
Q . 
Note that  is precisely the average cost in arbitrage equilibrium.  QQC /)(
In a sense this is a natural definition, but there exists a difficult problem: how to 
determine the output level Q  in this definition? Obviously, this output level cannot be 
derived from profit maximization. The reason is that profit maximization will result in a 
state of zero-profit output, regardless of the constraints of technology and budget. 
To avoid this difficulty, we define the rate of profit on the basis of arbitrage 
equilibrium, instead of competition equilibrium. To be precise, denote the initial budget 
by M , then the equilibrium quantities Q  is solved from the budget constraint, or 
equivalently, the cost constraint 
(14)  MQC )( . 
As an illustration, consider the Cobb–Douglas production function .  Then 
the cost function will be 
LAKQ 
(15)  










  
11
)()(])()[()(
A
QD
A
QWiQC . 
Remember that D  is a function of factor price and does not depend on the output. Solve 
the budget constraint equation MQC )( to get  )(
D
MAQ , and then we obtain the 
average cost 
(16)  



 11
)(
)( MD
A
D
MA
M
Q
QC . 
Substituting into the formation of the rate of profit to obtain 
(17)  11
/)()(
)( 1    MD
AP
QQC
P
QC
Q . 
If 1  , then we have 1/)(/)(  DAPQCQ , which is independent of M . 
This is a remarkable phenomenon: if the production function exhibits constant returns to 
scale, then the rate of profit is independent of the initial budget.11 
In general, the higher the rate of profit in equilibrium, the more efficient is the 
economy. In open economies, those countries with higher rate of profit on identical goods 
will have Competitive Advantage.12 For more details please skip directly to section IV.  
II.D.   Modigliani–Miller Theorem 
In this subsection we show that the Modigliani-Miller Theorem can be viewed as a 
consequence of arbitrage equilibrium. Now that the Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
represents one of the first formal uses of a no arbitrage proof in the context of the 
modern theory of finance (see Miller 1988), maybe this is not coincidental. 13 
The Modigliani-Miller Theorem is a cornerstone of modern corporate finance. At its 
heart, the theorem is an irrelevance proposition: a firm’s financial decisions do not affect 
its market value. The assumptions of Modigliani-Miller theorem deal with various types 
of capital market frictions that are at the heart of effective arbitrage (Modigliani and 
Miller 1958). 
As is well known, the market value of the firm is determined by its cash flows (with 
profits as major component). Under the condition of arbitrage equilibrium, the net profits 
satisfy 
(18)  )1()()(   iKMrMPQQCPQQ . 
______ 
11
 The empirical evidence approximately supports constant return to scale. In a majority of cases, the sum of the 
exponents of the labor and capital factors of the fitted Cobb–Douglas function is close to unity, and hence fitted Cobb–
Douglas functions are very nearly homogeneous of the first degree. For details, see Simon (1979). 
12
 This term is borrowed from Michael E. Porter (1985). The term competitive advantage seeks to address some of the 
criticisms of comparative advantage. It has been criticized that comparative advantage may lead countries to specialize in 
exporting primary goods and raw materials that trap countries in low-income economies due to terms of trade. The 
principle of competitive advantage attempts to correct for this issue. 
13
 Diamond (1967) has pointed out that the result of Modigliani-Miller theorem is a consequence of competitive 
equilibrium with price takers facing the same prices. 
   Now consider the capital structure of the firm, i.e., the proportion of debt and equity 
used to finance the firm’s operations. In general, the total budget at the beginning of each 
period may either be accumulated or financed during the past periods. In principle, the 
accumulated part of total budget can be taken as equity ( E ), and the financed part can be 
viewed as debt ( ). When interpreting in this way, the total budget can be divided into 
two parts
D
DEM  . Substitute into net profit we get 
(19) )1()()1()(   iKrDEiKMrQ . 
From this it follows that a firm’s capital structure does not affect its net profit if it can not 
affect the capital stock in equilibrium. In other words, firms with the same inputs and 
outputs will have the same net profit. This is essentially the Modigliani-Miller 
Proposition.  
More fundamentally, if, under certain conditions, the financial policy indeed affects the 
net profits in equilibrium, then the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition fails to hold 
in general. This is what Miller (1988) emphasizes when he says that "showing what 
doesn't matter can also show, by implication, what does." The systematic analysis of such 
assumptions led to an expansion of the frontiers of economics and finance (see 
Modigliani 1988). 
II.E.  Ricardian Equivalence 
In this subsection we show that the Ricardian Equivalence can be derived from no-
arbitrage based production theory. Once again, it is not coincidental. 
It is well known that Ricardian equivalence too is an irrelevance proposition (see 
Akerlof 2007), which holds that consumers internalize the government's budget 
constraint: as a result, the timing of any tax change does not affect their level of spending. 
Consequently, Ricardian equivalence suggests that it does not matter whether a 
government finances its budget with debt or a tax increase, because the effect on the 
aggregate demand is the same. 
The logic of Ricardian equivalence is that no-arbitrage equilibrium leaves unaffected 
the future cash flow of both the government and the households. In fact, within the no-
arbitrage framework, the effect of both debts and taxes can be analyzed either from the 
side of the government or the households.  
From the point of view of the government, the choice between debts and taxes just 
amounts to its financial decision. In doing this, the technology constraint must be 
interpreted as the production function of the government (see Buchanan 1976).  
To be precise, assume that in each period the government finances some extra budget 
through debts ( ) at the begging of each period and repaid by taxing (D T ) at the end of 
each period, or equivalently, at the beginning of the next period. Thus, as in the case of 
the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, the total budget can be divided into two 
parts DBM  ,where B  is the initial budget with no debts. Correspondingly, the no-
arbitrage constraint must be modified accordingly 
(20) )1()1( rMTiKPQ   . 
So the government’s cash flow at the end of each period becomes into 
(21) TiKrDBMPQQ  )1()()(  . 
To see the effect of debts on cash flow, rewrite the equation 
(22) )()1()( TDriKBrQ   . 
It follows that, other things equal, Ricardian equivalence is possible only if the taxes for 
financing the government debt exactly cover the interest cost ( TDr  ).  
The same model can be reinterpreted to analyze the effect of tax on households. In 
doing so, the technology constraint need to be reinterpreted as the Household Production 
Function (see Becker 1991).  
To be precise, we assume that the households had foreseen that government will 
increase taxes (T ) at the end of the period. Accordingly, rational households will divide 
their total wealth at the beginning of each period into two parts: the consumption budget 
( B ) and the discounted value of future taxes ( ). As a result, they will reduce current 
consumption in order to capitalize the future tax obligations. Consequently, if the 
government chooses to tax at the same rate as risk-free interest rate (
D
TDr  ), then the 
future cash flow of rational households would be the same as if the government had 
chosen to tax at the begging of each period.  
In summary, a full analysis of the wealth effect of government debt would have to 
involve a comparison of the rate at which the debt is taxed with the risk-free interest rate. 
The net-wealth effect of government debt depends on the relative efficiency at the margin 
of government versus household production (see Barro 1974).  
III.  COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS 
Only the simplest production functions admit solutions given by explicit formulas; 
however, some properties of solutions for a given production function may be determined 
without finding their exact form. It is the task of comparative statics to show the 
determination of the equilibrium values of decision variables in arbitrage equilibrium 
with state variables being specified (see Samuelson 1941). 
In fact, it turns out that, under given conditions of technique the behavior of the 
economic system is governed by the subsystem of the budget constraint and no-arbitrage 
constraint 
(23)  . 



)1()1( rMPQiK
MiKWL

Comparative static analysis is primarily concerned with this subsystem. In this subsystem, 
under given conditions of technique, real variables and nominal variable are not 
independent quantities; they are connected by the system of two linear equations. Since 
both equations are accounting identities, any change in any one of the variables must 
show up somewhere, resulting in a corresponding change in at least one of the other 
variables. Another remarkable characterization of this subsystem is that there will always 
be positive degrees of freedom. 14 
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 In theory as well as in practice, the higher the degrees of freedom, the more complex will the system likely to be. In 
general, the number of degree of freedom of the system is decreased as we proceed from the general to the more particular 
cases. However, since the economic system has been proved to be an Evolving Complex System (see Anderson et al. 1988; 
Arthur et al. 1997; Blume and Durlauf 2006), those macroeconomic models with zero degree of freedom entailed a 
methodological error. 
But, to enable our model to work at the macro level, all the variables in our model 
must be interpreted as the corresponding aggregate variables in macroeconomics. For 
example, the technology constraint must be reinterpreted as aggregate production 
function, and the total budget as the quantity of money demanded in arbitrage 
equilibrium15, and so on. As long as we insist on practicing macro-economics we shall 
need aggregate relations. 
III.A.  Neutrality of Money 
Neutrality of money is the idea that prices respond proportionally to changes in the 
quantity of money (see Lucas 1996). If money is neutral then the economy exhibits the 
classical dichotomy: money affect only nominal variables, with no effect on real 
variables.  
Fortunately, since real variables and nominal variables dually appeared in both of these 
two equations of constraints, it immediately eliminated the classical dichotomy: it is 
impossible to break down the system into the real sector and the monetary sector. Both 
real variables and nominal variables are determined in truly general equilibrium 
manner—by the system as a whole. This complex interaction of monetary and real forces 
completely freed us of the troublesome classical dichotomy.  
Further, it will be shown that the neutrality of money imposed very strong constraint 
on the behavior of the economic system. To see this, taken the physical variables 
( ) as fixed and then consider the system of linear equations with price 
variables . Thus we have only two independent equations to determine three price 
variables: the system is not determinate. It is the existence of this positive degree of 
freedom that enables us to escape the classical conclusion that money is neutral. 
QKL ,,
W Pi,,
In fact, it is easy to see that price vector ( ) and the quantity of money (PiW ,, M ) are 
so related that if we multiply price vector by a factor then the quantity of money will 
indeed be increased the same proportion in order to preserve arbitrage equilibrium. On 
______ 
15
 The “demand for money” has been taken to be the equilibrium quantity of money which people with some rules of 
behavior and given patterns of cash flow will hold. For details, see Akerlof (1973). 
the other hand, a change in the quantity of money leads the corresponding system of 
linear equations to having a solution given by a proportional change in the price vector. 
However, this is just a specific solution of the system. 
To get the general solution of the system, solving  as functions of i  PW ,
(24)  





Q
rMi
Q
KP
L
Mi
L
KW
)1()1(  . 
It follows that, if the quantity of money is exogenously determined, then the rental price 
of capital ( i ) is in indeterminate and serves as a free variable. This positive degree of 
freedom allows for the non-neutrality of money. 16 
To summarize, even taking the real variables (  andQKL ,, r ) as fixed, the neutrality 
of money is just a specific solution of the system and hence does not tend to hold in 
general. Neutrality of money is a situation that is the exception and not the rule.  
One way illustrating the failure of neutrality is to consider the theory of endogenous 
money. To this end, assume that the quantity of money is endogenously determined, then 
we can eliminate M  from the subsystem to get the following accounting identity 
(25)  )1()( rWLriKPQ   . 
This identity amounts to saying that the total revenue of output ( ) equals the user 
cost of capital (
PQ
)( riK ) pluses the cost of labor measured at the end of each period 
( ). From this revenue-expenditure identity it follows that the arbitrage 
equilibrium condition indeed imposed an essential constraint on the pattern of behavior of 
)1( rWL 
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 The economical interpretation of this positive degree of freedom is that the system can adjust to any value of the 
rental price of capital, and eventually approach a state of no-arbitrage equilibrium. On the other hand, the finding that the 
nominal interest rate is indeterminate in no-arbitrage equilibrium agrees with both empirical and theoretic evidences. For 
example, Friedman (1968) showed that the relation between the quantity of money and interest rate is much complex and 
monetary policy cannot peg interest rate. Similar result was also obtained by Tobin (1958), who showed that the direction 
of the relationship between the rate of interest and the demand for money is somewhat ambiguous. In fact, by now there is 
no general agreement on the theory of the relation between money and interest rate, as indicated by the Gibson paradox. 
price variables. This pattern is much more complicated than the relation predicted by the 
classical monetary theory. 
Specially, if the concept of capital has been generalized to the broad sense to 
include human capital ( ), then this revenue-expenditure identity degenerated 
into 
0L
(26) )()(   rMriKPQ , 
where the second equality holds because the budget constraint degenerated into 
MiK  in such a case.17 To see what does this equation mean, rearrange the right-hand 
side of it to get  iKiKrrM  )( , which equals the interest cost ( iKr ) plus the 
depreciation cost ( iK ). It follows that in arbitrage equilibrium the value of physical 
output can just cover the user cost of capital. 
On the other hand, it is easy to see that this identity looks suspiciously like the 
equation of exchange 
(27) MVPQ  , 
where V  is the velocity of money. As pointed out by Fisher (1911), the equation of 
exchange merely expresses in form convenient for analysis the fact that the currency paid 
for goods is the equivalent of the value of the goods bought. In view of this, and in view 
of the fact that all of the three fundamental equations in our model are just accounting 
identities, our revenue-expenditure identity can be a viewed as a natural generalization 
of the equation of exchange. 
From the viewpoint of equation of exchange, the foregoing equation simply implies 
that in arbitrage equilibrium the velocity of money must satisfy  rV . Further, it can 
be shown that r  turns out to be the minimum of the velocity of money. This is 
because that in arbitrage equilibrium no firms have motives to invest more than the user 
cost of capital. All money exceeding the user cost of capital will be deposited in asset 
______ 
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 In the theory of endogenous growth, the concept of capital has been broadened to include human capital (see Lucas 
1988).  
market to get risk-free interests, and hence the velocity of this part of money equals zero 
within each period. “You can lead a horse to water,   but you can’t make him drink.” 
Analogously, you can force money on the system, but you can’t make the money 
circulate against new goods and new jobs. On the other hand, if economic system allows 
for profitable arbitrage, then the demand for money tends to increase since more arbitrage 
trade will take place. Against a given quantity of money, this means that the velocity of 
money will tend to rise. Thus the velocity of money indeed reaches its minimum in 
arbitrage equilibrium. 
The demonstration of this minimum of the velocity of money is of central importance. 
In a sense, it shows that arbitrage equilibrium behaves in much the same way as the 
thermodynamics equilibrium, rather than mechanics equilibrium. Indeed, the equation of 
exchange of Fisher looks suspiciously like the equation of state of idea gas, which shows 
the relationship between the pressure, volume, and temperature for a fixed amount of idea 
gas. In view of this, it seems that the velocity of money can be viewed as the temperature 
of the economic system. The limiting circumstance of minimum velocity of money seems 
like the absolute zero of temperature, which is impossible for any process to approach in 
a finite number of operations. Physically, the third law of thermodynamics states that the 
entropy of a closed system at absolute zero is exactly equal to zero (see Feynman et al. 
2013). 
From the viewpoint of thermodynamics, the revenue-expenditure identity behaves in a 
way similar to the equation of state of ideal gas. It is well known that experimental gas 
laws, such as Boyle's law, Charles' law and Gay-Lussac’s law, can be considered as 
special cases of the equation of state of idea gas, with one or more of the thermodynamic 
variables (temperature, pressure, and volume) held constant (see Feynman et al. 2013). 
Similarly, this revenue-expenditure identity also contains some empirical macroeconomic 
laws as special cases and hence can provide micro-foundations for them, such as the 
Gibson paradox, Okun's law, Phillips curve, and Keynesian doctrine. 
III.B.  The Gibson Paradox 
The Gibson paradox is an empirical regularity that the general price level and nominal 
interest rate are positively correlated. It was regarded as a paradox because it seemed to 
contradict the prediction of classical monetary theory. According to the quantity theory of 
money, the price level would be expected to be rising if the quantity of money is 
increasing. In addition, by the theory of liquidity preference, the nominal interest rate 
should be falling when the quantity of money is increasing. If both these classical 
doctrines are true, the general price level and nominal interest rate should be negatively 
correlated. However, Gibson observed the empirical tendency for the general price level 
and nominal interest rate to apparently move together. This empirical evidence was 
believed to be a paradox because it seemed to constitute a disconfirmation of one of the 
important predictions of classical monetary theory. 
To our knowledge, the Gibson paradox still remains an empirical phenomenon without 
a widely accepted theoretic explanation (see Keynes 1930; Fisher 1930; Friedman 1968; 
Sargent 1973; Fama 1975). However, it turns out that Gibson paradox is consistent with 
the pattern of behavior of price variables determined by arbitrage equilibrium. To see this, 
solve for the price level from the revenue-expenditure identity and take partial derivatives 
with respect to nominal interest rate to get 
(28)  
Q
rWLriKP )1()(    0)( 

Q
rK
i
P  . 
So, other things being the same, 18  general price level and nominal interest rate are 
positively correlated. This is essentially the positive correlation noted by Gibson in 1923. 
Within our framework, it becomes into a consequence of the arbitrage equilibrium. In 
view of this, the no-arbitrage framework thus has reconciled the long-standing 
contradiction between the quantity theory of money and the theory of liquidity preference. 
______ 
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 In practice, if “other things” cannot hold constant, then we have to take total derivatives rather than partial 
derivatives. It is unnecessary and impossible to adopt a prior classification of variables into “endogenous” and 
“exogenous”. How economic variables have in fact been related to each other can only be tested by practice. 
Historically, Keynes (1930) first used the term Gibson paradox to emphasize the 
observations that nominal interest rates were highly correlated with the general price 
level but approximately uncorrelated with inflation as contradicting Irving Fisher’s 
equation linking interest rates to expected inflation. Indeed, the classical monetary theory 
had expected a correlation between the nominal interest rates and the rate of change, 
rather than the general level, of prices. Yet, as indicated by the Gibson paradox, empirical 
data contradicted this view. On the other hand, Fama (1975) pointed out that the finding 
there are no relationships between interest rates and rates of inflation is in fact 
inconsistent with the Efficient-Market Hypothesis.  
We shall show that this inconsistency can also be reconciled within the no-arbitrage 
framework. Indeed, a dynamical version of the revenue-expenditure identity turns out to 
be generally consistent with both the Fisher effect and the Gibson paradox within the 
framework of rational expectation. For details see section V. 
III.C.  Okun’s Law 
In macroeconomics, Okun's law is an empirically observed relationship relating 
unemployment to losses in potential GDP (Okun 1962). 19  Since the nominal GDP 
exactly uals PQ  at the macro level, we can derive Okun’s law from the revenue-
expenditure identity as special case. Once again, it is not co
eq
incidental. 
Denote the total labor force by L , and let the unemployment rate in each period be u , 
which ranges between 0 and 1. Then in each period we have )1( uLL  . Now 
substituting for in the revenue-expenditure identity and taking the partial derivative of 
 with respect to u  we have 
L
PQ
 0)1()( 
 rLW
u
PQ . (29)  )1)(1()( ruLWriKPQ  
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 The original work of Okun (1962) addressed the measurement of potential GNP, which coincides with the 
equilibrium value of nominal GDP in a closed economy. Okun’s basic technique consisted of a leap from the 
unemployment rate to potential output, rather than a series of steps involving the underlying factors. Indeed, the latter 
technical route has been adopted in this paper and hence can provide micro-foundations for statistical estimates. 
From this it follows that, other things the same, an increase in the unemployment rate 
means a loss in equilibrium GDP. This is the essence of Okun’s law. 
   Note that the stability and usefulness of Okun’s law has been disputed. The reason is 
that Okun's law is approximate because factors other than employment may also affect 
potential output. In fact, any variable in the revenue-expenditure identity can influence 
the level of output.  
III.D.  Phillips Curve 
Phillips curve doctrine implies that lower unemployment can be purchased at the cost 
of higher inflation. Hence there would be a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment. Since its inception, the Phillips curve has been criticized for its lack of 
foundations in microeconomics and general equilibrium theory (see Lucas 1976). Also, a 
good deal of efforts went into developing theoretic foundations for this empirical 
observation (see Samuelson and Solow 1960; Phelps 1967; Lucas Jr. and Rapping 1969; 
Mortensen 1970; Tobin 1972; Modigliani and Tarantelli 1973; Friedman 1977).  
In this subsection we shall establish the concrete function relationship between 
unemployment and the rate of change of wages, which turn out to be similar to the 
original Phillips curve fitted to 1861-1913 data (Phillips 1958). 
Now denote the wages in the previous period by  and the change rate of money 
wages in the current period by , which ranges from 
0W
1w   to 1 so that . 
Substitute for W  and  in the revenue-expenditure identity and rearrange it to get 
)1(0 wWW 
L
(30)  
)1(
)()1)(1(
0 rLW
riKPQwu 
  . 
Taking logarithm, we get the function relationship between unemployment and the rate of 
change of wages 
(31)  
)1(
)(log)1log()1log(
0 rLW
riKPQwu 
  . 
It is easy to note that this equation looks suspiciously like the original Phillips curve 
fitted to 1861-1913 data, which reads (in our notations20) 
(32)  984.0)9.0log()100*log(394.1  wu . 
To continue, we shall state the conditions under which there exists a trade-off between 
wage increases and unemployment. Mathematically, this amounts to saying that the total 
derivative of wages with respect to unemployment must be negative. Using the fact that 
the increase of unemployment may affect nominal GDP ( ) according to Okun’s law 
and taking the total derivative of   with respect to u we get 
PQ
w
(33)  2
0 )1)(1(
)]([)1()(
urLW
riKPQu
du
PQd
du
dw




. 
Thus the Phillips curve slopes downward ( 0
du
dw
) only if 
(34)  
u
rWL
u
riKPQ
du
PQd



1
)1(
1
)()(  . 
In terms of elasticity we have 
(35)  
u
u
PQ
rWL
du
PQd
PQ
u


1
)1()( . 
So, to guarantee that the Phillips curve slopes downward, ceteris paribus, the elasticity of 
GDP with respect to unemployment must be sufficiently large. This amounts to saying 
that an increase in unemployment will result in dramatic losses in GDP, which in turn 
will lead the wages to going down. 
______ 
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 Note that in the original equation of the Phillips curve the level of unemployment ( ) is ranged from 0 to 100, 
instead of from 0 to 1. It is for this reason that the original function had to be replaced by . 
u
ulog )100*log(u
On the other hand, if the Phillips curves slopes upward instead ( 0
du
dw
) then there 
will be stagflation, a situation where high unemployment and high inflation steadily 
coexist. To be precise, stagflation will happen only if 
(36)  
u
u
u
u
PQ
rWL
du
PQd
PQ
u


11
)1()( . 
This amounts to saying that the increase of unemployment can just result in moderate 
decrease in GDP. As a result, stagflation reared its ugly head. 
In conclusion, there does not exist an unconditional trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, whether short or long, temporary or permanent (see Friedman 1968). 
Further, the condition under which stagflation tend to occur is itself of interest, which 
perhaps justifies the no-arbitrage production theory as a useful framework. 
III.E.  The Keynesian Doctrine 
According to modern Keynesian doctrine, the Keynesian revolution was a revolution in 
method. A key element in all Keynesian models is a “tradeoff” between inflation and 
output: the higher is the inflation rate, the higher is the output (see Keynes 1936). That 
view is embodied most directly in the negatively sloped Phillips curve: the higher is the 
inflation rate, the lower is the rate of unemployment. As a result, the effects of aggregate 
demand policies tend to move inflation rates and output (relative to trend) in the same 
direction, or alternatively, unemployment and inflation in opposite direction. 
However, it is found that in practice the typical inflation-output relation is the reverse, 
that prices and output tend to be related negatively, rather than positively (see Lucas 1973; 
Friedman and Schwartz 1982). This clearest conflict between empirical evidence and 
Keynesian doctrine was widely regarded as the failure of Keynesian revolution (see 
Lucas and Sargent 1978). In this subsection, we shall show that there does not exist an 
unconditional trade-off between inflation and output, thus reconcile this long-standing 
confliction. 
To see this, denote the price level in the previous period by  and the rate of change 
of price level in the current period by
0P
 , which ranges from 1  to so that 
)1(0  PP . Now solve for the output from the revenue-expenditure identity and 
substitute P to get 
(37)  
)1(
)1()(
0 



P
rWLriKQ . 
Take the total derivative of output with respect to inflation 
(38)  2
0 )1(
)]1()([)1)(1(


 


P
rWLriKrW
d
dL
d
dQ . 
So output and inflation move together ( 0d
dQ
) only if 
(39)  
)1)(1()1)(1(
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This amounts to saying that the elasticity of the labor with respect to inflation must 
satisfy 
(40)  





 1)1()1( rWL
PQ
d
dL
L
. 
To see what this condition means, we shall express this condition in terms of the 
partial elasticity of output to inflation. First, take the partial derivative of output with 
respect to inflation to get 
(41)  

 

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Second, rewrite the output-inflation tradeoff condition using the partial elasticity of 
output to inflation 
(42)  






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Q
Qd
dL
L 1
. 
Thus, other things the same, there is a tradeoff between inflation and output only if the 
elasticity of labor to inflation is larger than the partial elasticity of output to inflation. Or 
equivalently, only if the direct effect of inflation on the decrease in output can be 
cancelled out by the effect of inflation on the increase in labor demand. 
IV.  STATIONARY OPEN ECONOMIES 
In this section we first use the basic model to calculate the Purchasing Power Parity 
exchange rate. Then we generalize the basic model to an open economy and use it to 
explain the Balassa–Samuelson effect. 
IV.A.  Purchasing Power Parity 
The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) doctrine has been used as a guide in establishing 
equilibrium exchange rate. Historically, Cassel (1918) first formulated the PPP 
hypothesis by arguing that “the rate of exchange between two countries is primarily 
determined by the quotient between the internal purchasing power against goods of the 
money of each country.” 
Contrary to the traditional consumption-based comparison of PPP, we shall calculate 
PPP on the basis of no-arbitrage framework for production theory. 21 It will be shown that 
our production based PPP calculation confers methodological advantages in that it 
constitute a marriage of the Keynes arbitrage version and the production-cost version. 
Within our framework, however, both these tradition versions of PPP become 
implications of our model, as opposed to assumptions (see Samuelson 1964). 
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 Historically, Keynes had interpreted the PPP doctrine as the doctrine of spatial arbitrage for every goods (in the 
absence of transport costs) early in World War I. See Samuelson (1994). 
Now assume the price level of the same product in foreign country to be *P , in terms 
of the foreign currency. 22 Then the net profit of identical goods abroad can be denoted by 
. So the rate of profit in foreign country is )()( ****** QCQPQ 
(43)  1
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Thanks to the no-arbitrage constraint, in equilibrium the rate of profit in different 
country will be the same. Thus we can get the PPP identity in terms of the rate of profit 
(44)  
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By virtue of this identity, the ratio of price level can be solved as a function of average 
cost 
(45)  **** /)(
/)(
QQC
QQC
P
P  . 
Thus in equilibrium the ratio of general price levels must equal the ratio of the average 
costs between these two countries. Denote the equilibrium ratio of the average cost by 
(46) *** /)(
/)(
QQC
QQC , 
then we can get the familiar expression of PPP 
(47)  . *PP 
From this it follows that, other things equal, the PPP exchange rate ( ) between two 
countries is determined by the relative average cost of identical goods in these two 
countries. If the average cost of domestic goods is relatively low in arbitrage equilibrium, 
the purchasing power of domestic currency will be relatively high. To emphasize this 
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 Throughout the asterisk (*) is used to denote the corresponding variables in foreign country. 
note that different countries, at the same period of time, have different production 
functions even apart from differences in natural resource endowment. 
Suppose, at one extreme, that technologies in both countries are perfect complements. 
It means that the production function of domestic country is },min{ LKAQ  , where  
stands for productivity. Then the cost function will be C
A
AQWiQ /)()(   and hence 
the average cost equals AWiQQC /)(/)(  , the costs of unit factor. By symmetry we 
get the PPP exchange rate 
(48)  **
*
*** /)(
/)(
Wi
Wi
A
A
QQC
QQC

 . 
This brings us back to the production-cost version. In conclusion, if technologies in both 
countries are perfect complements, then the equilibrium exchange rate must be equal to 
the ratio of unit cost of production.  
To proceed, recall that both of the output levels Q  and  in the PPP identity are 
assumed to be solved from the budget constraint (or cost constraint) respectively. Assume 
that the initial budget is 
*Q
*M  measured in foreign currency and denote the nominal 
exchange rate by e , which means that one unit of foreign currency equals e units of 
domestic currency, then the equilibrium quantities   and Q must satisfy Q *
(49)  * , . ** )( MQC  *)( eMQC 
As an illustration, reconsider the Cobb–Douglas technology, which give rise to 
production functions  and  at home and abroad, where LAKQ  ** ****  LKAQ 
A and stand for productivity respectively. Then the relative average cost determines 
the PPP exchange rate 
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It is worth emphasis that if 1   and , then the formulation of PPP 
exchange rate becomes into 
1**  
(51)  **
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In conclusion, if the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in both 
countries, then the PPP exchange rate is independent of the nominal exchange rate ( e ).23 
On the other hand, if 1   or , then 1**     will be a function of e , 
denoted by )(eh . In such a case the fixed point of this function will determine an 
equilibrium exchange rate )( h , which can be calculated by iteration algorithm. 24 
Illustration 1: USA and China 
______ 
23
 The empirical evidence approximately supports constant return to scale. In a majority of cases, the sum of the 
exponents of the labor and capital factors of the fitted Cobb–Douglas function is close to unity, and hence fitted Cobb–
Douglas functions are very nearly homogeneous of the first degree. For details, see Simon (1979). 
24
 It is easy to see that e  implies . In this case the law of one price holds and hence the 
fixed point indeed defines an equilibrium exchange rate. 
** ePPP  
 
Notes: )( rPi   , where 2.17P  is the price of a Big Mac in China. 
In such circumstances, the equilibrium exchange rate is 1912.6 . That is, $1 equals 
¥  in no-arbitrage equilibrium.   1912.6
Illustration 2: USA and UK 
 
In such circumstances, the equilibrium exchange rate is 6024.0 .  
Illustration 3: USA and EU 
 
In such circumstances, the equilibrium exchange rate is 8463.0 .  
Illustration 4: USA and Japan 
 
In such circumstances, the equilibrium exchange rate is 44.102 .  
However, in practice no one would expect $1 to buy the same level of real goods in 
different countries. Given the opportunity to freely invest $1 in different countries, other 
things equal, the country with higher rate of profit will have competitive advantage (see 
Porter 1985). Thus to get competitive advantage in trade means that 
(52)  
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As a result, competitive advantage can be achieved only if the relative average cost in 
arbitrage equilibrium is lower than the relative price of domestic goods. So competitive 
advantage in international trade can only be maintained by endlessly reducing the cost of 
production. It is the irreducible differential in costs that leads to importing rather than 
producing at home. 
In conclusion, the competitive advantage that stems from the difference in the rate of 
profits has much to do with the pattern of international trade. 
IV.B.  Balassa-Samuelson Effect 
The Balassa–Samuelson effect is the observation that the currencies of developed 
countries would generally appear to be greatly overvalued. This phenomenon has been 
studied at various levels of abstraction (see Balassa 1964; Samuelson 1964, 1994). Here 
we give a comparative-statics explanation on the basis of arbitrage equilibrium.  
To this end, we need to extend our basic model to an open economy at first. In a sense 
this is an analogy of the extension of the IS-LM Model (Hicks 1937) to the Mundell–
Fleming model (Mundell 1963; Fleming 1962).  
Assume the fraction of exported products to be x . Then the no-arbitrage constraint 
becomes into 
(53)  . )1()1()1( * rMiKQxePxPQ  
The domestic market can be in equilibrium only if this accounting identity is satisfied.25 
For our present purposes solve for the exchange rate from the no-arbitrage identity 
(54)  
xP
xP
QxP
iKrM
QxP
xPQiKrMe ***
)1()1()1()1()1()1(   . 
Note that richer country usually tends to have higher capital accumulation. So the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect can be explained by means of capital stock. To see this, taking 
the partial derivative of  with respect to e K to get 
______ 
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 The other two constraints, namely the technology constraint and budget constraint, are remaining unchanged and are 
still at work. 
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In terms of the elasticity of nominal exchange rate to capital stock we have 
(56) 0)1(* 
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. 
Thus, other things the same, higher capital stock will yield lower nominal exchange rate. 
Or equivalently, the increase of capital accumulation will stimulate domestic currency to 
appreciate. As a consequence, the domestic currency of the developed country with 
higher capital stock would generally appear to be overvalued in arbitrage equilibrium. 
To sum up, it is the no-arbitrage constraint that is crucial, rather than the law of one 
price. Therein lies the essence and rationale of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
V.  DYNAMIC ECONOMIES 
So far the economy has been assumed to be stationary. Actually our framework turns 
out to be very convenient to study dynamic economies. We may now pass over to the 
dynamic analysis of economic system by building a multi-period model. For simplicity, 
we discuss the closed economy only. The general principles carry over to open 
economies. 
V.A.  The General Model 
Similar as in the stationary case, the axiomatic basis of the dynamic model consists of 
three fundamental constraints of technology, budget and no arbitrage. We proceed 
directly to the fundamental equations, which give rise to a system of difference equations 
(57)  . 
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This system of difference equations includes the stationary system of section II as special 
case.26 
From the point of view of recursive macroeconomic theory (see Ljungqvist and 
Sargent 2012), the three fundamental accounting identities constitute a decision function 
which maps the state variables into decision variables of the economy. Since accounting 
identity must hold for any values of the variables, its structure is time-invariant. Thus, 
under given conditions of technique the decision function is also time-invariant. 27 
To describe the dynamic evolution of the economic system the law of motion for state 
variables must be explicitly characterized by a transition function. Mathematically, the 
state transition function of a dynamic economy can be described by a difference equation 
(58)  ),,,;,,,( 10101 ttt xxxyyyy  . 
where ’s are vectors of state variables, ’s are vectors of decision variables. The state 
transition function 
ty tx
  determines how the economy transit from current state  to future 
state , which in conjunction with the decision function will determine the vector of 
decision variables . This iteration process dynamically gives the entire time path of 
the economy. So, if the state transition function is specified, then the analysis of the 
dynamical evolution of the economy is a straightforward matter.  
ty
1ty
1tx
Specially, under the assumption of the Markov state (see Ljungqvist and Sargent 2012), 
the motion of the economy is determined by a first-order difference equation 
(59)  ),(1 ttt xyy  . 
______ 
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 Variables with subscript represent the corresponding values at period . As in stationary economy, variables without 
subscript denote the corresponding steady state variables in what follows. 
t
27
 Our model differs from the recursive methods of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) in one major respect. In their 
recursive models the decision function (a time-invariant policy function) was solved from a functional equation known as 
Bellman equation, taken the transition function as given. Unfortunately, a fatal logical flaw may arise from their approach 
to dynamic economics due to the existence of competitive arbitrage. To see why, consider an economy in which we can 
take prices as state variables and quantities as decision variables. Now suppose that the transition function has predicted 
that asset price will increase in the future, then rational-expectation based arbitrage will drive asset price to rising 
dramatically rather than obeying the given transition law. This self-denying pattern means that the economy may not have 
a time-invariant transition function as common knowledge. Indeed, such dynamic-programming-based econometric policy 
evaluation procedures have been criticized by Lucas (1976) and Kydland and Prescott (1977).  
Ignoring random shocks, this difference equation is essentially the theoretical framework 
adopted by Lucas (1976) to criticize econometrical policy evaluation. In view of this, the 
Lucas critique just emphasizes the importance of state transition function. Indeed, it has 
been shown that even simple and deterministic first-order difference equations can 
exhibit an extraordinarily rich spectrum of dynamical behavior (see May 1976). 
Since a change in policy necessarily affects the state of the economy in highly complex 
fashion, we should specify in advance the state transition function that governs the 
behavior of the dynamic economy if we want to predict the effect of a policy. Without 
knowledge as to which and how state transits as policy changes, we cannot assess 
alternative policies. The only scientific quantitative policy evaluations are to compare the 
consequences of alternative state transition function and to select that one with good 
operating characteristics. Thus, within the no-arbitrage framework of dynamic production 
theory, the choice of policies is equivalent to the choice of the state transition function of 
the system,28 and macroeconomic policy evaluation is reduced into scenario analysis on 
the basis of rational expectation. 
The advantage of our framework makes it possible, to some extent at least, to have a 
“two-level” structure of analysis. 29 At the static level, at each given state of development, 
the decision function determines the basic mechanism for effective resource allocation 
since there is no arbitrage opportunity. At the dynamic level, however, economic 
development as a dynamic process of moving from one stage to the next requires 
industrial upgrading and corresponding improvements in infrastructure. Such upgrading 
can be described by a state transition function. The two levels of analysis can be 
combined, so that dynamic evolution of the economy can be predicted. 
______ 
28
 This framework differs from that of Kydland and Prescott (1977). Formally, Kydland and Prescott supposed that the 
economy can be described by a vector of state variables, a vector of policy variables, a vector of decision variables, and a 
vector of random shocks. The movement over time of these variables is given by state transition equation in which the 
vector of policy variables explicitly appeared. However, as criticized by Lucas (1976), the change in policy induces change 
in the state transition function, which in turn induces a change in the policy rule, and so on. This iterative process indicates 
that policy-invariant state transition equations are inconsistent with the maximization postulate in dynamic settings. In fact, 
we have no reason to believe that state transition function is invariant under changes in policy and no reliable way to break 
it down into well-understood components. Thus it is necessary to view the policy as the state transition function itself, 
rather than preordained parameters in it. It is the state transition function that must be estimated, not just some of its 
parameters. 
29
 This two-level structure of analysis has been emphasized by Lin (2009) within the framework of New Structural 
Economics. 
 V.B.  Zero-profit Equilibrium as Limiting Case 
In this subsection, we consider the limiting case when the periods become sufficiently 
large, with emphasis on how the behavior of the economy is governed by the state 
transition equation. In order to simplify the task, our analysis proceeds under the 
assumption of constant risk-free interest rate. That is, rrt   for any time 
period . ,2,1,0t
To simplify the complication, we assume that all of the net profit at the end of each 
period will be automatically reinvested at the beginning of the next period, and firms 
cannot borrow money during the production process. Thus, the state transition equation 
for total budget was given by 
(60)  )(1 tt QM  . 
The cash flows in this system amount to the series of net 
profits )),(,),(),(( 21  tQQQ  .  At any period t , the net profit satisfies 
(61)  rMKirMQ ttttt  )1()(  . 
Inductively, we get the following sequence of inequalities 
(62)  . 10
2
1)(

  tttt rMrMrMQ 
Here,  is the initial budget at the begging of period . 0M 0
Empirically, the risk-free interest rate can be assumed to satisfy 1r , so  as 
. Therefore, by the property of limit, we get 
0tr
t
(63)  0)(lim  tt Q . 
In conclusion, the traditional zero-profit equilibrium can be regarded as a limiting case 
of the arbitrage equilibrium. So, under given conditions of technique and so on, if firms 
cannot borrow money during the production process, the economic system must move 
ultimately to a zero-profit stationary state; which is the essential thesis of classical 
production theory.  
In practice, however, there does not need infinite process of reinvesting. Typically, 
there may be an upper limit to the capital deepening. So when the accumulation of capital 
has been accomplished, new investment just need to cover the user cost of capital. In this 
case, there will be positive profits ever after. On the other hand, in such circumstance the 
state transition equation for budget must be modified accordingly. So the behavior of the 
economy is indeed governed by the state transition equation. 
V.C.  Neoclassical Growth 
The usual neoclassical conditions of economic growth can be interpreted as state 
transition equations in a natural way within no-arbitrage framework. We proceed in the 
spirit of the Solow model (Solow 1956). 
As a result of exogenous population growth the labor force increase at a constant 
rate . Thus we get the state transition equation for labor n
(64)  )1(1 nLL tt  . 
Assume that part of the instant output is consumed and the rest is saved as capital 
accumulation.30 Let the fraction of output saved be a constant , and then the following 
basic identity gives the state transition equation of capital 
s
(65)  ttt sQKK  )1(1  . 
These two state transition equations, in conjunction with the fundamental constraints, can 
trace out, step by step, the growth path of the economy. 
Now denote the ratio of capital to labor by tt LKR / . We need to determine its 
equilibrium value.  First, we assume that all price variables take constant values. Second, 
______ 
30
 It follows that the quantity of capital is measured in physical units of output. This assumption is unnecessary in other 
parts of this paper. 
we assume that the quantity of money is endogenously determined and eliminate it by 
using the budget constraint and no-arbitrage constraint 
tM
1((66)  )()  riKr tt WLtPQ . 
This turns out to be the dynamical analogy of the revenue-expenditure identity for 
stationary economy. Now dividing we get tL
(67)  RrirW 1(
s
Lt
t )() QP  . 
Solving for KKQ ttt /))1(( 1    and dividing  we get tL
(68)  
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Substituting it in equation (67) yields 
(69)  RrirWRP ()
s
n )()1(   . 
This linear equation determines the equilibrium value of the capital-labor ratio, which 
in turn determines the capital accumulation path of the economy. This equation can be 
interpreted in the same way as that of the Solow model. Its right-hand side equals the cost 
of unit labor and R units of capital at the end of each period. As for its left-hand side, it is 
precisely the revenue of unit labor employed with R units of capital. As a result, the 
equilibrium capital-labor ratio is determined in such a way that the revenue equals the 
cost. 31 
______ 
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 A remarkable characterization of this equilibrium condition is that it is based on price variables. This enables the 
existence of Nominal Rigidity, which has been shunted aside in the Solow model.  
V.D.  Synthesis of Schools of Macroeconomics 
Generally, different state transition function will result in different dynamic behavior 
of the economic system. In practice, more precise prediction of the dynamic behavior of 
the economic system can only be achieved if or when it becomes possible to write down 
the actual state transition function. Without detailed knowledge of the state transition 
function only very crude statement can be made. 
In this subsection, it will be shown that some of the critical assumptions of different 
schools of macroeconomics, such as nominal rigidity and rational expectations, can serve 
as state transition equations. The difference between macroeconomics schools can be 
attributed to the differences in their state transition equations. Thus the no-arbitrage 
framework for production theory provides a unifying framework to synthesize different 
schools of macroeconomics. 
1. Nominal Rigidity.—In practice, the adjustment of economic variable may not be 
instantaneous. Many economic processes, such as wage bargaining and Price adjustment, 
include time-delay phenomena in their inner dynamics. This time-delay characterization 
of wages and prices make nominal rigidity ideally suited to serve as the state transition 
equation of the economy. 
Rigid Wages: The assumption of rigid wages played a critical role in explaining the 
consistency of economic equilibrium with the presence of involuntary unemployment, 
which is usually considered as the most important achievements of the Keynesian theory.  
To be precise, suppose that there exist a time delay ( ) in the adjustment of wages, 
then the wages in each period t  equals the wages   periods ago. Mathematically, we 
have 
(70)   tt WW . 
For example, if the wage in period t is determined by the marginal product of labor, 
then we have )tL,(   
 ttt KAFLP
0
W . It is easy to see that when the time-delay 
approaches zero ( ), we obtain the traditional marginal-productivity 
equation ),( tt
t
AF
L

tt LKPW . 32 
Rigid Prices: As is well known, the assumption that prices are rigid is crucial to 
Keynesian doctrine. Sticky prices are an important part of macroeconomic theory since 
they may be used to explain why markets might not reach equilibrium in the short run or 
even possibly in the long-run.  
Suppose that there exist a time delay ( ) in the adjustment of price level, and hence 
the price level at period  equals the price levels t   periods ago 
(71)   tt PP . 
The classical assumption of price flexibility can also be formalized by setting the time 
delay equal to zero ( 0 ). Indeed, the state transition equation of Keynesian economy 
differs from that of neoclassical economy, just like ellipses differ from circles. 33 
Note that to simplify notation we use the same symbol   to represent the time delay 
for both wages and prices. However, in practice, different variable may have different 
time delay. In the extreme case, the economic system may simultaneously contain 
______ 
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 It is worth mentioning that this approach of describing the wage rigidity differs from the device adopted by 
Modigliani (1963), which relies on the notion of a “potential” supply function. This approach also differs from that of 
Akerlof (2007), where nominal rigidity was explained by assumption that employees have a norm for what wages and 
prices should be. 
33
 Due to the similarity between the flexibility in economic variables and symmetry in physical laws, it is worthwhile to 
quote the words of Feynman et al.  (2013, Chapter 52) concerning Broken Symmetries:“We have, in our minds, a tendency 
to accept symmetry as some kind of perfection. In fact it is like the old idea of the Greeks that circles were perfect, and it 
was rather horrible to believe that the planetary orbits were not circles, but only nearly circles. The difference between 
being a circle and being nearly a circle is not a small difference, it is a fundamental change so far as the mind is concerned. 
There is a sign of perfection and symmetry in a circle that is not there the moment the circle is slightly off—that is the end 
of it—it is no longer symmetrical. Then the question is why it is only nearly a circle—that is a much more difficult 
question. ... Now the question is whether we have a similar problem here. The problem from the point of view of the circles 
is if they were perfect circles there would be nothing to explain, that is clearly simple. But since they are only nearly circles, 
there is a lot to explain, and the result turned out to be a big dynamical problem, and now our problem is to explain why 
they are nearly symmetrical…” 
random time delays for both nominal and real variables, and hence would collapse into 
chaos (see May 1976). 
2. Rational Expectation.—Modeling expectations is crucial in all models which study 
how firms make choices under uncertainty.  Concrete analytical results must rest on 
concrete assumption about expectations. And it is well known that the macroeconomic 
predictions of the model may differ depending on the assumptions made about 
expectations. 
To make dynamic economic models complete, various expectation formulas have been 
used. In response to perceived flaws in theories based on adaptive expectations, Muth 
(1961) advanced the hypothesis of Rational Expectations. As will be evident, the 
character of rational expectation formation makes it well-suited for the state transition 
equation of the economy. 
For example, under rational expectations, the actual price vector at period t  always 
equals the mathematical expectation of the price vector of the succeeding period. In this 
case, the corresponding budget constraint and no-arbitrage constraint becomes into 
(72) ,  ttttt MLWKi   ][ 1 )1(][)1( 1 tttttt rMQPKi   , 
where  is the mathematical expectation operator, conditioned on given information 
set. The crucial issue is what assumption to make concerning the information set. What 
kind of information is used and how it is put together to frame an estimate of future states 
is important to understand because the character of dynamic process is sensitive to the 
way expectations are influenced by the actual course of events. 
][
As an illustration, assume that the price level in period t  is governed by the anticipated 
rate of inflation in period 1t . Mathematically, let )1( 11   ttt PP   so 
that ])[1(][ 11   ttt EPPE  , where ][ 1tE   stands for the anticipated rate of inflation. 
As in the discussion of Gibson paradox, we can eliminate the quantity of money, replace 
 by ]1tP ])[1( 1 tt EP[E  ,  and solve for the nominal interest rate to get 
(73)  
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It follows that the one-period nominal interest rate ( ) depends on, among other things, 
the price level ( ) and the anticipated rate of inflation (
ti
tP ][ 1tE  ). As a result, our no-
arbitrage production theory under rational expectations is consistent with both the Fisher 
effect and the Gibson paradox. In view of this, the Fisher effect and the Gibson paradox 
each touched one part, but only one part, of the elephant. Though each was partly in the 
right, and both were in the wrong! 34 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this article I propose a dynamic production model under the joint constraints of 
technology, budget and no arbitrage. Comparative static and dynamic analysis indicates 
that this model is consistent with the behavior of firms in reality, and can explain a wide 
range of economic phenomena. Compared with classical production theory, this dynamic 
production model confers some methodological advantages: 
First, this no-arbitrage based production theory can be viewed as a natural 
generalization of classical production theory based on profit maximization. For example, 
it is shown that the zero-profit equilibrium induced by the profit-maximization turns out 
to be a special and at the same time a limiting case of the arbitrage equilibrium. At the 
macro level our no-arbitrage equilibrium equation can be a viewed as a natural 
generalization of the Equation of Exchange (Fisher 1911). 
Second, this no-arbitrage framework for production emphasizes the general 
equilibrium of the economic system as a whole and constitutes a marriage of production 
theory and finance. For example, it is shown that the Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
(Modigliani and Miller 1958) can be derived as a consequence of arbitrage equilibrium. 
______ 
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 This last sentence is borrowed from the famous poem "The Blind Men and the Elephant" by John Godfrey Saxe 
(1816–1887). 
In essence this reflects the fundamental economic significance of the arbitrage 
equilibrium. 
Third, this no-arbitrage based production theory constructs a bridge between 
microeconomics and macroeconomics, and at the macro level it can provide a unified 
framework to explain some empirical laws in macroeconomics. For instance, Okun’s law 
can be derived from our model as special case. Also, we can establish the concrete 
function relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of wages, which turn 
out to be similar to the original Phillips curve fitted to 1861-1913 data (Phillips 1958). In 
open economies, the purchasing power parity exchange rate between two countries is 
shown to be the ratio of average costs in arbitrage equilibrium. Further, comparative-
statics explanation of Balassa-Samuelson effect can also be given on the basis of 
arbitrage equilibrium (see Balassa 1964; Samuelson 1964, 1994). 
Fourth, this no-arbitrage framework for production theory can successfully reconcile 
some long-standing contradictions arising from the classical theory. For example, the 
complex interaction of monetary and real forces in our model completely freed us of the 
troublesome classical dichotomy. Further, a dynamical version of our no-arbitrage 
production model turns out to be generally consistent with both the Fisher effect and the 
Gibson paradox (see Keynes 1930; Fisher 1930; Friedman 1968; Sargent 1973; Fama 
1975) within the framework of rational expectation. Conditions for stagflation to occur 
are derived too. It is shown that there does not exist an unconditional trade-off between 
inflation and output (see Lucas 1973; Friedman and Schwartz 1982). This reconciles the 
long-standing confliction between Keynesian doctrine (see Keynes 1936) and the 
empirical evidence, which was widely regarded as the failure of Keynesian revolution 
(see Lucas and Sargent 1978). 
Fifth, from the viewpoint of recursive macroeconomic theory (see Ljungqvist and 
Sargent 2012), the fundamental constraints of technology, budget and no arbitrage 
constitute a decision function which maps the state variables into decision variables of the 
economy. The dynamic evolution of the economic system can be characterized by a state 
transition function. Generally, different state transition function will result in different 
dynamic behavior of the economic system. It is shown that different behaviors of 
different kinds of economies can be explained by the differences in their state transition 
functions. Thus the no-arbitrage framework for production theory provides a unifying 
framework to synthesize different schools of macroeconomics. 
In conclusion, these methodological advantages justify the no-arbitrage based 
production theory as a useful framework.  
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